A ESTRUTURA DIÁRQUICA DA DEMOCRACIA REPRESENTATIVA MILLIANA COMO OPOSIÇÃO À CRÍTICA DE HONNETH À LIBERDADE JURÍDICA

Abstract

Axel Honneth, in Freedom´s Right, presents a critique of the problematic elements of legal freedom from its first formulation in the 17th century, which was negative in nature, to a second moment, marked by the expansion of subjective rights, which transforms private space into a place of ethical reflection from which judgements of "good" and "justice" are derived. As an example of this second moment, Honneth uses the thought of John Stuart Mill. However, even acknowledging the importance of Mill's theorising, Honneth insists on affirming that legal freedom implies the constitution of the subject as a solitary actor with strategic objectives. Our proposal here is to suggest that by using Mill's thought to illustrate his reconstruction of the notion of legal freedom, and concluding that it is limited, Honneth does not reach the extent of the English author's proposal for social philosophy. The imbrication between Mill's notions of freedom and equality permeates the private sphere guaranteed by individual rights and introduces intersubjective issues at the moment of ethical reflection. In other words, there are clear elements of influence from "others" in determining the moral judgements that legitimise Millian social action. In order to explore this issue, we first try to identify the criticism of the insufficiency of recognising reciprocal obligations between subjects who enjoy their individual rights, and then compare his arguments with John Stuart Mill's formulations on the subject.