The ”Philosophical Anthropology”
The groundworks of Charles Taylor’s Philosophy of Human Behavior
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26694/pensando.vol16i38.6792Keywords:
Philosophical Anthropology, Comportamento Humano, Charles TaylorAbstract
This article aims to discuss the “philosophical anthropology” of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, especially its impact on the understanding of human behavior. First, we highlight what is fundamental about human behavior that distinguishes it from the behavior of other animals. In this sense, we show how human behavior is organized around what the philosopher calls the “horizon.” Next, we discuss how human beings understand themselves based on their behavior. Taylor addresses these peculiar dimensions of behavior through the notions of self and identity. Finally, we address how these concepts are constituted by moral judgments. Taylor’s philosophical anthropology seeks to be a response to naturalist theories, which reject the validity of ontology to understand human behavior. Taylor’s conceptual explorations seek to highlight the importance of moral notions of good in explaining how human beings act.
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