A “Antropologia Filosófica”
Os fundamentos da Filosofia do Comportamento Humano de Charles Taylor
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26694/pensando.vol16i38.6792Palavras-chave:
Antropologia filosófica, Comportamento humano, Charles TaylorResumo
Este artigo tem por objetivo discorrer sobre a antropologia filosófica do filósofo canadense Charles Taylor, principalmente seu impacto para o entendimento do comportamento humano. De início, destacamos o que há de fundamental no comportamento humano que o distingue do comportamento dos outros animais. Nesse sentido, mostramos como o comportamento dos humanos se organiza em torno daquilo que o filósofo denomina de “horizonte”. A seguir, tratamos de como os seres humanos se autocompreendem a partir de seu comportamento. Taylor trata dessas dimensões peculiares do comportamento por meio das noções de self e identidade. Por fim, abordamos como esses conceitos são constituídos por julgamentos morais. A antropologia filosófica de Taylor procura ser uma resposta às teorias naturalistas, que rejeitam a validade da ontologia para compreender o comportamento humano. As explorações conceituais de Taylor buscam salientar a importância das noções morais de bem para explicar como os seres humanos agem.
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