Discourse and Dissensus

Lyotard and Rancière as critics of Habermas

Abstract

This article analyzes Jean-François Lyotard’s and Jacques Rancière’s critiques of Jürgen Habermas’s model of normative grounding. Building on the distinction between moral and ethical models in political philosophy, it argues that while Habermas’s discursive procedure offers important criteria for normative validation, it is limited when addressing the multiplicity of forms of expression in social interaction. Lyotard introduces the concept of “différend” to highlight the incommensurability between different language regimes, while Rancière emphasizes “dissensus” as a form of political claim-making that challenges the conditions of access to discursive procedures. The article suggests that an adequate theory of social normativity must consider not only discursive mechanisms of validation, but also pre-discursive struggles over the capacity for political participation and the aesthetic practices that constitute them. It proposes a reassessment of Habermas’s theory in light of Lyotard’s and Rancière’s contributions, expanding the analysis of normativity to include forms of expression and contestation that precede or escape rational discourse.