The constitutive principles of open secularism in the secular age according to Taylor and Maclure

Abstract

This paper analyzes the possibility of establishing a consensual understanding that open secularism operates as a relevant factor for the proper functioning of liberal democracies, which are composed of citizens who hold pluralistic worldviews and diverse conceptions of the good life, thereby legitimizing its presence in the public sphere of the secular age. Accordingly, the central question of our analysis is: what are the meanings of open secularism in liberal democracies in the secular age? In seeking to understand the philosophical implications arising from this aporia, we draw upon the reflections of Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure. The Canadian philosophers are not satisfied with the classical distinction made in modernity to address this issue—namely, the sharp legal-political separation between religious power and state power. Thus, we aim to examine the debates on the constitutive principles of open secularism within a broader framework that encompasses the diversity of beliefs and values—whether religious or secular—professed by citizens in the democratic public sphere of the secular age. Our investigation proceeds as follows: (i) we analyze the constitutive principles of open secularism as sources of freedom of conscience; (ii) we examine the institutional procedures of open secularism in safeguarding these constitutive goods; and (iii) we compare reasonable accommodation practices as a normative balance of freedom of conscience. Based on this triad, we seek to study the constitutive principles of the goods upheld within the regime of open secularism in the secular democratic age.