MOORE Y LA CRÌTICA AL IDEALISMO
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26694/pensando.v7i14.4727Palabras clave:
Moore, idealismo, subjetividad, fenomenologíaResumen
En este artículo se ofrece una re-lectura del ensayo de Moore “The refutation of idealism” que, oponiéndose a lo que es la tendencia mayoritaria (que aspira a una reconstrucción puramente lógico-formal del argumento), llama la atención sobre el hecho de que la crítica al idealismo remite en Moore, en última instancia, a la propuesta de una teoría de la subjetividad cuya base es introspectivo-fenomenológica.
Citas
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