Jogos cooperativos: uma introdução ao valor de Shapley

Gil Bracarense Leite

doi:10.26694/2764-1392.974

Authors

Gil Bracarense Leite Universidade Federal Fluminense

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26694/2764-1392.974

Keywords:

game theory, cooperative games, Shapley value

Abstract

This paper introduces the cooperative games with a special focus to the solution concept of Shapley value that has its properties described in detail. There are presented theoretical examples that can be solved both cooperatively and non-cooperatively, enabling a direct comparison between the two approaches of Game Theory. In addition, usual applications of Shapley value in practical problems like cost allocation games and voting games are described in order to intensify the understanding of this solution concept. By presenting the introductory characteristics and practicality of Shapley value, this paper can be used as reference for future applications and discussions about cooperative games and their solution concepts since there are few studies available in Brazil on this topic.

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