Phenomenology and Knowledge

Husserl and the possibility of a critique of reason

Abstract

This study focuses on one of the central philosophical problems that Husserl faced in his project to establish a phenomenological philosophy, namely, the possibility of objective knowledge. According to Husserl, this problem would be the result of a fundamental epistemological difficulty, that of the transcendence of the object of knowledge in relation to the subjective experiences of the knowing subject. Based on an analysis of texts that span from 1902 to 1913 – in particular, the seminal work that inaugurated the transcendental level of phenomenology, the first book of the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology –, we intend to explore the way in which Husserl conceived of this difficulty and his approach to offer an adequate resolution. It is expected to show that, for Husserl, it is not a question of answer to the problem of the objectivity of knowledge according to its traditional formulation, encoded in the well-known subject-object opposition, but of pointing out and disarming the very conditions for such understanding, permeated by assumptions that distort the meaning of the problem of knowledge, preventing its correct formulation and, consequently, a satisfactory response.