Factualism about practical reasons
a defense
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.26694/pensando.vol15i35.4498Mots-clés :
reasons for action, factualism, error cases, Jonathan Dancy, DisjunctivismRésumé
The paper's aim is to investigate if factualism about practical reasons can provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of error cases. Some philosophers have assumed that factualism is strongly threatened by the possibility of false belief. They claim that if the agent is mistaken about the relevant fact, then there is no fact to which she can appeal to justify and explain her action. So to assess the strength of the objection, I consider Jonathan Dancy’s factualist response to the problem and I argue that, while quite convincing, it requires a commitment to the awkward idea that intentional explanation can be non-factive. Dancy’s account implies denying the widely accepted thesis that a true explanation cannot have a falsehood as its explanans. But contrary to what one might think, I defend that factualism can deal with error cases without having to endorse Dancy’s controversial idea. To show this, I develop a disjunctivist form of factualism that can solve the problem at stake by keeping what is most promising in this theory: that all because-constructions are factive. If my thesis succeeds, then I think there is no reason for us to give up factualism in the face of error cases.
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