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SITUATIONALITY AND CIRCUMSTANTIALITY UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF JAN PATOČKA'S NATURAL WORLD: CRITICISMS AND OPENINGS TO HUMAN HORIZONS

*Situacionalidade e circunstancialidade sob a perspectiva do mundo natural de
Jan Patočka: críticas e aberturas para horizontes humanos*

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Resumo: Este artigo discute o mundo natural do filósofo Jan Patočka. O seu alcance reflexivo pretende guiar-nos numa leitura das possibilidades concretas na constituição ontológica do humano. Para tanto, esta constituição é utilizada na caracterização da fenomenalidade do mundo, ou seja, num exercício solidário do humano revelando-se nas diversas circunstâncias nele situadas. Portanto, a naturalidade do mundo é vista como um ato de solidariedade com quem este mundo é partilhado. Dessa forma, em nossa argumentação, há necessidade de ler esse ato através do conceito de mundo natural de Patočka, pois, através dele, a compreensão dessa experiência se enquadra no âmbito da proto-horizontalidade, atividade que implica uma ação que nunca fecha o horizonte mundano a uma questão importante: os seres não só estão presentes diante de nós, mas são antecipados pela fenomenalidade do mundo e sugeridos pela experiência dos sentidos desta solidariedade, isto é, da corporeidade.

Palavras-chave: Jan Patočka; movimentos existenciais; corporalidade; posicionamento.

Abstract This article discusses the natural world of philosopher Jan Patočka. Its reflexive scope is meant to guide us in a reading of the concrete possibilities in the ontological constitution of the human. In order to do so, this constitution is used in the characterization of the phenomenality of the world, that is, in a solidary exercise of the human revealing itself in the various circumstances situated in it. Therefore, the naturalness of the world is seen as an act of solidarity with whom this world is shared. In this way, in our argument, there is a need to read this act through Patočka's concept of the natural world since, through him, the understanding of this experience covers itself under the scope of proto-horizontality, an activity that implies an action that never closes the mundane horizon to an important question: beings are not only present before us, but they are anticipated by the phenomenality of the world and suggested by the experience of the senses of this solidarity, that is, of the corporeality.

Keywords: Jan Patočka; existential movements; corporeality; positioning.

1. Introduction - Crisis and the natural world

This article starts from the discussion about the concept of the natural world by the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Its reflective scope should guide us as a reading of place within this concept. The reading aims to engender how, from certain a *priori* instituted in the place - more precisely, the habits of life, culture and other influences such as politics and economy -, they remain as a possibility of a more potent ontological constitution to being-in-the-world. The point to be emphasized in this text is that, in the

characterization of the phenomenality of the human horizon, an embryonic state of proto-horizontality is kept, which would make the world be revealed under the circumstances of choices facing the situationality involved with it. Therefore, the degree of "naturalness" of the place is enriched in a maieutic exercise on with who this world is shared with, that is, in a continuous and unfinished recognition in which the being is incessantly constructed as a being-there. This fact, in a way, further enriches the ontological question of the naturalness of the world.

First, it is relevant to look for the roots of this term to investigate the way in which it connects with the issue of corporeality, the central basis of the formation of this world as a comprehensive field of beings. One of the thinkers to be concerned with this question was Edmund Husserl. Husserl (1970) focused his critique on the crisis of European sciences, with a proposal of a philosophical approach to the problem of the senses through an analysis that could reorient the uncovering of the basic principles of philosophy on the subject. The attempt had been to rescue the rational field from the perspective of a new critique of the subject away from the chains of 18th century Enlightenment thought (FINDLAY, 2002). Husserl's argument, also addressed to the critique of positivism and scientism that had been established in the 19th century, called for redoubled attention to the way in which this rationality had been paralyzed in the methods of the human sciences (HUSSERL, 1970). This restriction concerned subjective reflexivity as an unconditional act of a supposed universalist law of nature, in which it could only be accessed through the development of a coherent structure arising from exact science.

This exact science method would subjugate human reflexivity to the unique access to some so-called truth ($\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$), which would become the basis of all conformation of reality through an unconditionally overbearing idealization (FINDLAY, 2002). In other words, the problem for him is that this scientificized experience could build a discernible narrative easily usable to incubate human life, thus destroying his critical sense (reflection, rationality).

However, it is observed that Husserl (1977) followed, even if not directly, a pattern of analysis in which the meaning of compression did not come from an understanding of the practical issues of understanding. This meant that the phenomenological path practiced by Husserl was guided from a prescription to a solution to the crisis of the senses, and that through a rationality in which the return to a supposed essence would not be completely revoked. The issues related to the transcendental ego – even its world being an "experienced world" –, in short, it coincided in the abandonment of a responsibility that was identified in the same problems of the scientific method, which universally systematized the human world (FINDLAY, 2002).

Therefore, Patočka (1996a) identified in Husserl that the crisis of reason did not necessarily arise from a problem of identifying the paths followed by philosophical theories, but precisely, from a lack of analysis of the conditions in which this world provided for this reason arose as a practical plot to the humans who were part of it. In summary, the basis of Patočka's criticism of Husserl converged on the degree of naturalness that the Husserl gave to the world, in which its constitution was disconnected from the concreteness of human praxis, or rather, from human actions that, in general terms, shaped it as a world (DI PIERRO, 2007). Husserl, in this way, described in his works a world guided by the action of transcendental intersubjectivity, transforming it into an enriched collection of individual perceptions by the awareness of this subjectivity (BARBARAS, 2019).

Even if Patočka agreed with Husserl about the goals of phenomenology, that is, with the act of describing phenomena without distortion or, in other words, facing it as it is did not mean that the things of the world would be ideally shaped by themselves, but that they would appear integrally in the movement of human experience with them (RODRIGUEZ, 2015). Thus, the only way to interpret things as they are is to ascertain the moment in which they, variably, appear to human perception.

The problem, however, would be the following: is this moment given by action or by *praxis*? Then, the difficulty here is often to think that we see or know what reality is insofar as we do not know whether what we see is a practiced relationship or an individual impulse (PATOČKA, 2004c). There is, at this point, a problem of identification between the “I” and the “we”, that is, a counter-action that, despite the thing existing in itself, it would need at all times the sieve of the “I” to really pass to be concrete, since describing is a systematization of consciousness when talking about something (Findlay, 2002).

Due to this adversity, Patočka (2004b) alludes that, in fact, what phenomenology examines is the movement of human experience. The philosopher reiterates: the basic point of phenomenology is not only to describe things as they are, but to reflect on how we as well, in a circumstantial way, let ourselves be involved with the movements of this experience (and vice versa) (PATOČKA, 1998). It is because of this situation, to perceive the eidetic impossibility as a human foundation, that is, the impossibility of the total perception of what it is seen, because what is of the world is rooted in situations in which there is a prior knowledge long before the certificate (GARRIDO-MATURANO, 1998). But what does this prior knowledge mean?

According to Patočka (2020b), phenomenology should seek to mark a distance between human self-reflection and the accumulated baggage¹ of experiences available to subjects. This position is related to the removal of an insistent subjectivity in the thinking of both René Descartes and Edmund Husserl, and recognition of the setback of the manifestation of this rootedness at the same moment of “defining” who, in fact, manifests the concreteness of human experience (PATOČKA, 1998; 2004c). In other words, the cogito ergo sum, as well as the ego-transcendental, goes beyond the concreteness of the human world, that is, the corporeal base, insofar as they define an omniscient subject who institutes what the world is through that baggage (CHVATIK, 2010).

Another problem that phenomenological philosophy should tackle is to determine where such baggage comes from and how it takes root in a way that is intelligible to humans (RODRIGUEZ, 2015). We can mention, as an example, colonialist theories and those that manage or manage human impulses and desires for the benefit of promoting a lifestyle that, moreover, manage to be read in detail by common sense (from the floods of information of mobile app algorithms to neoliberal economic theory itself as a whole) (SAFATLE, 2020). Therefore, for Patočka (1998; 2016), since the problem of the world, philosophically speaking, is the world as a whole, the adversity is not to define this problem locally or to face it as something only competent to one or another nation, but rather to recognize it holistically, that is, to try to decipher the moments in which that aforementioned baggage manages to transform human experience into an extensively co-eligible, discernible and reproducible narrative (ŞAN, 2019).

The question of understanding this narrative would not be a megalomaniac task, but that of detailing what determines the phenomenal description in a selective framework between the useful and the disposable (or the prehistoric and the historical as the Czech philosopher argues) (PATOČKA, 1996b). Thus, the question for the philosophical movement of the world is, in a way, to convince ourselves that any individual act always presupposes a context that precedes it. This context can be economic, political, cultural, religious etc. And it is at this juncture that the field of particularities sense that composes it will be determined, where they will only have some degree of discernment within this context (RODRIGUEZ, 2014).

It is worth paying attention to the use of the term “sense” instead of “meaning”, since the context that precedes the individual action is not, indeed, fully incorporated in each subjective action, but is imperceptibly conditioned most of the time. According to Patočka (1998) and, precisely, also for Husserl (1995), human perception is more than just noticing the world for the particularities that are in daily contact with it. Thus, when any object is perceived, there is not only the realization that it is seen by these particularities;

¹ This “baggage”, according to Mignolo (2005), is called “Modernity”.

but that one has categorically (even if not at all) a contact with a whole and with a structure invariably greater than the limited perspective individual can achieve (FUMAGALLI, 2019). This limitation, for Patočka (1998), is to recognize that there is already, underlying, a subliminal longing for universality.

In this way, we realize that we perceive more than what is presented to us, even if this thing is directly related to us in what is currently given. For Patočka (2007), the perception of what is beyond the understanding of meaning is not a metaphysical or determining world: this capacity for comprehensive perception is also a human ability that, not necessarily, intertwines with consciousness, but can be protected through sensitivity, also keeping the power to create narratives without being agreed with intelligibility, such as those related to affectivity - the greatest example is human memory (MARGALIT, 2002).

If we go back to Husserl (1995), his approach to human experience with objects focuses on an act of experience transported to consciousness, that is, on the way in which objects gain a charge of understanding for us in an oriented form (remembering that, in this moment, the affective issue is not being addressed properly). Husserl thus concludes that no object in the world becomes as such without an adjectival charge given by the experience that the human has with it. Tacitly, this means that the world, for Husserl, by the way, its naturalness, is solidified through objectivity transcribed by subjectivity. By the way, there is a subjection of the thing, as an object, at the moment the subject predicates it (FINDLAY, 2002).

Patočka (1996a) focuses his criticism to Husserl right there. In Husserl, not only the individually perceived objects arise from this subjectified relationship, but a whole world conditioned by the same action, that is, there is here a world determined by the perception of the object through experience. However, what is not considered is a criticism of the position in which this subjectivity perceives this object, or rather, it does not take into account the place where this criticism was undertaken by the subject in the very act of perceiving. And this problem, according to the Czech philosopher, is not only up to Husserl, but since Descartes (PATOČKA, 2004d).

Therefore, for Patočka (2020b), human consciousness, when it perceives a whole outside the area of its cogitation - at the moment when it comes across an object -, also sights another phenomenon: the phenomenality of the world as an open field that precedes every particularity. In fact, it is in the relationship with this phenomenality that the rejection of the "I" begins to take (literally) shape, since consciousness receives a partner: the aforementioned memory, since the movement of mundane phenomenality starts to be translated from the sentience of these meetings, not a pre-guided determination (MARGALIT, 2002). This means that the world is never preceded by individual instances (nor it is recognized in a piecemeal way), but what really exists is a subjectivity that is being positioned in this incessantly comprehensive situation, that is, the world (PATOČKA, 2020c).

It is worth mentioning that Patočka (2004a) does not disbelieve in the ontological manifestation of being or, as Heidegger (2001a) would say, in the reflection on the comprehensive meaning of being in what makes multiple existences possible. However, the author problematizes the ontological manifestation of being when he rejects its reduction to these punctual experiences. In Patočka's (1998) universal perception, human situationality is much more related to its concrete context, to its culture, to its community (or group), because the human world only becomes a world when experienced in an engaged way. This engagement, in that same universal perception, is to transform the beings of this world as historical beings, because the events of their world require a greater engagement on their part, making them, at the same time, political beings (PATOČKA, 1996b).

The choice of this term (politics) is purposely used by Patočka (1996b) precisely to determine the horizontality of the human world. If the phenomenality of the world - in the manifestation of a larger context in the contact with some situation or concrete object that

appears - provides a dimension that escapes the bonds of the known through the individual way, the world becomes a possible through the constant situationality of the human beyond the immediately given. This means that not only the place is problematized in this action, but also the time. And this to the extent that there is a recurrence of learning from past events and the demand for actions that aim at a transformation in the status quo when their answers are insufficient and, thus, clamoring for some transformation or rupture (future) (CLADAKIS, 2019).

However, there is a detail: none of these temporal possibilities fails to be problematized inside the possibility in the (present) moment. For humans, in fact, what is immediately presentable in every moment of their lives is also the realization that, even in this situation of rupture, they will face resonances from other worlds that do not coincide with the same temporal adjectives as their own. Therefore, what he is really faced with is the judgment of something as comprehensible (or its opposite) (GARRIDO-MATURANO, 1998). In other words, individual action can hardly be seen as insular since, involved in the world, it carries the responsibility of this and other worlds when thus faced with the predicate of alterity (*praxis*).

Consequently, it is implied that the future is a concrete experience in which a projection was made within the possibilities limited by the place. From this, we can say that, if the horizontality of the world is given by the verification of a holistic relationship, the conformity of the place (which is not a restriction, but an understanding of the limitation of the subject as self-determining) prepares the human understanding of the pluralities of the world in a proto-horizontality (TAVA, 2016a).

This means that this proto-horizontality is not based (indeed, should not be based) primarily on a priori codes or jurisprudence, but on flesh and blood beings. More precisely, this proto-horizontality implies beings that are not only present before us, but also those anticipated by the phenomenality of the world and suggested by experience (PATOČKA, 2020a). This proto-horizontality is an activity that implies a determined action or performance in never closing the mundane horizon for an important question: a world can only be designated in this way when it is necessary to recognize the subjects in their face-to-face concreteness, which, for the most part, converges in their corporeality (SAFATLE, 2020).

Commonly, this type of attitude receives the name of “politics”, that is, an activity in which people take care of matters in a public way, and not only privately (ŞAN, 2019). In a way, this exercise, which, for Patočka (2020b), coincides with the Socratic maieutic attitude, dispenses the rejection of the self-absorbed situationality of the “I”, which is incumbent on a deep reconsideration of the epistemological character of this constitutive self that seeks, through the *praxis*, those who can share the feelings (language) of pain and joy in the world compared to vertical plots, for example, of crude economism (TAVA; MEACHAM, 2016). That said, what would be the real power of the circumstances of the human world that calls us to see the strength of a place and its actual problems?

2. Place and Circumstantiality

In our argument, we see the need to read this question through Jan Patočka's concept of the natural world since, for him, the understanding of the experience of these feelings in their scope of *praxis* (what reveals the solidary field between human beings) is highly required to understand how those verticalizations of the human life world that are generally identified with the term “place”. Place is understood as a series of interventions of different natures that forget a more horizontal association between human beings, which is consistent with an awareness of the problems that converge to massive attempts at massification or extinction of everyday sociability (SERRANO, 2014).

As we advance into the future, revealing a certain way of organization that is not tangible only at a graspable moment, but encompasses other circumscriptions - due to the impossibility of proper classifications of human life -, what could we consider from the

past, that is, from the rooting in the daily problems already faced (and, not infrequently, reappeared several times) and in the present, in this strong need for exchange of experiences that matches the multiple essential ways of recognizing alterity to be seen as a participant (and not as a threat)?

As already exposed by Husserl (2003) in his work “The earth doesn't move”, unlike the classification of modern science, the Earth is not an object in orbit along with other celestial bodies. As is suggested by the title of his work, the Earth is not reduced, but becomes a *topos*. In a literal translation, *topos* designated in antiquity the place around which each thing looks like a being, but with the movement of the Earth, it is rotating in a particular way. This effect of the turning of the Earth, particularly in Martin Heidegger, carries a dimension of movement in which not only time (with its sweeping proportion of human behavior) brings to speech the manifestation proper to the experience of language to name these beings - in its turning (*Das ring*) in its circulation - but it is also done in a spatial dimension, where this time takes another form in relation to the mere classification of objects on Earth (HEIDEGGER, 2001b).

In the turning of the Earth, each object becomes something discernible to speech, and this happens through *poiesis*. Such *poiesis* or poetic language reveals that this being already exist (with me) on Earth. Alike detail was forgotten by Heidegger (PATOČKA, 2004d). This *poiesis* moves us close to the Earth to the point of unraveling the lines of this being, its configurations and its features in the celestial dome. Incidentally, this term “dome” is extremely fundamental. Heidegger (1992) would make the following statement when describing his role in *Topos*.

What is the πόλις? The word itself puts us on the right course, provided we bring to it all-illuminating Greek experience of the essence of Being and truth. πόλις is the τόπος, the pole, the place around which everything appearing to the Greeks as a being turns in a peculiar way. The pole is the place around which all being turn and precisely in such a way that in the domain of this place beings show their turning and their condition. The pole, as this place, lets beings appear in their Being and show the totality of their condition. The pole does not produce and does not create beings in their Being, but as pole it is the abode of the unconcealedness of beings as a whole. The πόλις is the essence of the place [*Ort*], or, as we say, it is the settlement [*Ort-schaff*] of the historical dwelling of Greek humanity. Because the πόλις lets the totality of beings come in this or that way into the unconcealedness of its condition, the πόλις is therefore essentially related to the Being of beings. Between πόλις and “Being” there is a primordial relation. This word πόλις is, in its root, identical with the ancient Greek word for “to be” *πελειν*: “to emerge. to rise up into the unconcealed” (Cf. Sophocles, *Antigone*, *πολλὰ τὰ δεῖνα ... πελεῖ*). The πόλις is neither city nor state and definitely not the fatal mixture of these two inappropriate characterizations. Hence the πόλις is not the notorious “city-state” but is, rather, the settling of the place of the history of Greek humanity - neither city nor state but indeed the abode of the essence of this humanity (HEIDEGGER, 1992, p. 89-90).

As may be seen, in *Topos*, the meeting of the uncovering of beings is found in the common habitus, involved in this donation and aggregator dome of meaning. This meaning would identify a historical man, a temporality that allowed being to be a “being-time” (HEIDEGGER, 2001a). Such a statement is very surprising, because the Earth here is, in a way, held back in a cultivation that borders on the universalizing. According to Patočka (1996b), the experience of Polis involves a polemic degree (*polemos*) of disputes and dissidences, which generates identification in the difference emitted in the sentience that some places may cause to this “being-time”. They are places that emit, in their topophilic connotation, the uncovering of the engagement to face fear, anguish, defeat or the threat of oppressive forces (such as psychic and physical violence) (TUAN, 2013).

Heidegger (2001b) himself would say, in his other text called “Building, dwelling, thinking”, that such actions described would come from this ability to house all this

sentience in the edificatory moments (*aedificare*) and in the cultivators (*collere*). However, what may have been forgotten is that these moments were worthy of a movement of the human capacity to perceive, through its positioning, that the changes occurred in the beings manifestability requested or imposed a transfiguration of the human itself, which Patočka (2004b; 2004c) emphasizes with the term unsubjectivity.

In fact, the play of light and shadow, dealt with by Heidegger (2001c) in another text entitled “The origin of the work of art”, seems to have been a little out of place in the configuration of the donation dome of *Topos*. In a strict sense, *Polis* would manifest very similar openings, since it is independent, in the Heideggerian field of understanding, precisely from this difference in positioning arising from corporeity in the face of the play of light and shadows. Perhaps, for Heidegger (2001c), some bodies would be so dazzled by the morning light that they would be put to the insignificance of the grace of the language that he so prized, relegating them to be used as mere work tools – beings known as “*instrumentum vocale*”.

It is perceptible the way in which the situationality in this Heideggerian *Topos* is dubious, since how to determine its differences in a dome so omnipotent as it was in that *Polis*? Fortuitously, the indigo of his Heaven was too overshadowed, in which the play of light and shadow was not even a game, but a theater, because this Heaven does not seem to be so friendly with Earth. So, would this Heaven grant some *epoché* to Earth instead of a simple reduction?

A parenthesis is opened here to clarify the meaning of this *epoché* for Patočka (1996a) which differs from that of Husserl (1977). As we insist, the play of light and shadows - which we could call instantiation - is not only discernible to certain locational particularities. Of course, this instance provokes and requires a certain tuning of behavior that establishes a commitment to the place (HEIDEGGER, 2001b). In the same, the various events that are appropriated by the human reveal this importance that still holds the place in the face of structuralist interpretations, which insist on seeing it as a mere collection of archives (HEIDEGGER, 2001a).

However, it is essential to note that the human who is instantiated with the place is embodied with it, in fact, in it (PATOČKA, 1998). The human is not only aware of being somewhere. This is not enough for him, because inhabiting engenders, in addition to consciousness, memory, built at the moment of sharing moments (DODD, 2019). The most incredible thing is that, in this sharing, the reflection of the force of existential concreteness centers the human in the circumstance that is offered by the place.

And what does that mean? It means that, in addition to the importance that the human projects for the place, as a primordial factor to his existence entails in his subjectivity - and in his relationships -, a behavior in which his possibilities of being are limited in the actions carried out in this place (RODRIGUEZ, 2015). This, as discussed before, would not be a limiting thing in the pernicious sense of the term, but what is emphasized in this limitation is the importance of a transcendent ego encompassing, in his evaluative (or moral) framework, an entire judgment capacity of human and, surprisingly, their solutions. Thus, it is believed that the limitation does not end, but expands the borders of this place without having the need to impose aesthetically, legislatively or morally some kind of prior judgment (PATOČKA, 2020b).

More clearly, when Patočka (2004b; 2004c) insists on this phenomenological attitude, that is, an unsubjective attitude, he perseveres that human existence is a constant capacity for self-fulfillment. In this way, it starts from the reconsideration of existence as a movement, which generates the ability to understand the world, which can be called rootedness (past), self-sustainability (present) and transcendence (future). These existential movements comprise the human attunement with the place in the realization (and not imposition) of each one of them.

The first one is the understanding that we are already in an existing world, with an established language and with people who were born before us. The second is the moment of the affirmation of the “I” in this world, in the associative capacity that this “I”

has to perform in order to exist with others. It is the field of work association, as well as that of labor, since basic needs such as hunger, for example, are a propulsion factor for associative need, that is, in the political will to fight them. But here, another world is not created, because the “I” only insists on participating in the same that generated it.

However, the third movement is the moment when circumstances take their turn. It is a moment of rupture, but not of denial with what was once lived, but it preserves a character of re-positioning in the complexity of life's hardships when Heaven insists on not moving. However, the Earth persists in turning it when it embraces, on its surfaces, the light, water or snow thrown by Heaven.

More precisely, this complexity removes from those moments the danger of numbness arising from an icy image (that of eidetic reduction), given the limitation of the “I” in this place, when a crisis established in the game between “Heaven and Earth” breaks, simultaneously shakes the world and humans (GARRIDO-MATURANO, 1998). In other words, the act of turning a thing on the Earth is independent of the “I”, as this shocking, in fact, is a state of crisis that puts subjectivity in a suppression of judgment (DODD, 2019). The reason for this is not the existence of something definitive, but because this subjectivity is suspended in its ability to alter the facts that occur in its surrounding world (*Unwelt*). Thus, the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) is placed in such a conflicting (and conflicting) transcendence that the “I” is involved without permission, and not merely thrown into this game of instance and circumstance of place (BARBARAS, 2007).

Properly, in addition to these actions not being objectual and much less separate actions, they cannot be seen as granted moments and neither can the human be considered a spectator, but an “I” that is abruptly involved in this game having, as the only alternatively, the need to communicate in this game as a “we”.

In this “we”, separate subjectivity disappears. It is relativized, or rather, unsubjectified, becoming the relationship of subjects (and not of individuals) placed in the field of praxis through negotiation with one another. The most amazing thing is that this type of situation reveals a certain grace of human freedom (PATOČKA, 2002).

3. On an ontology of the shaken

If we turn our attention a little more to the first and second existential movements, an instancial capacity is opened for the human. In this capacity, it appropriates some event submitted in a range, in a way, close to it. From this capacity, another one derives, that is the capacity to situate comfortably in little problematized situations. Therefore, your responsibility for this place would have a maintenance character. In terms of freedom, it would be little would exercise, since the exchange of knowledge or problems with alterity would not find dissonances: it would be formally given and, possibly, ended. But, the third movement presented to us by Patočka (1998) harbors a criticism of this position when it makes us ask: what about those who stay outside this place? What do we do with them? Do they somehow manage to reach us? If yes, how should we answer to them? Would it be with the silence?

Perhaps, the third movement here instigates the characterization of transcendence such as a struggle (*polemos*) that must be exercised continuously, precisely so that the different in us is not silenced. If, for Patočka (1998, 2016), the third movement implies not accepting existence as having a permanent substrate, that is, having a predicted plot, it means that the human existent must also consider itself in a constant opening (movement), this being the act of human freedom.

It is important to remember that such acts of human freedom correspond to a limitation given by the place. Each act of freedom reveals a where and a how always different, or rather, it reveals that the only phenomenality is the world, in which men, animals, trees are found, that is, a phenomenal world revealed (and cultivated) under the

auspices of a historical responsibility² (PATOČKA, 2002). This means that a world which has the capacity to be always problematized, in fact, that has this need, it really happened because it allows, in its constant “situation” on Earth, a positioning along with the scope of Heaven (GARRIDO-MATURANO, 1998).

In this way, human transcendence never escapes from a certain contingency, that is, his body, as it is he who offers that sensitive circumstance cited above. Its difficulty in being reduced to a logical chain of cause and effect - not being banally absorbed in the great scientific and religious plots that insist on instilling an explanation as to whether its presence is desired or not very utilitarian - emphasizes the historical character of its manifestation as responsibility, as a historical world is cultivated by the plots of the language which it creates and disseminates³ (PATOČKA, 2020c). It is for this reason that, depending on the content addressed, there is a risk of instituting a crisis of understanding of alterity in which memory (language and feelings) is submissive to a conscience no longer under human judgment, but terrifying speeches, techniques and technologies in which the only intention of opening is to limit the other (MIGNOLO, 2005).

Therefore, it is believed that human transcendence in this circumstantial character of corporeal singularity - at the moment when it engenders the need for the construct of meanings -, this transcendence does not only do it to their peers, but in a holistic sense through the contemplation of the Earth's problems. Thus, it seeks a sociability given by the scope of Heaven, proclaiming a distance in which nothing here is banally distanced: only human freedom (its only) is established to manifest the sentience of human problems through itself (PATOČKA, 2007).

In fact, a sentience capacity to engage in the pains of other worlds; to leave the chains of the situationality of an extremely enlightened *Topos*, since not shaken, to position itself empathically in the struggle of and with the other. Only then would the other actually appear in the World, and not only on Earth. The possible shadows urged here are precisely this circumstance or, as we can already call it, the responsible freedom that highlights human places. This circumstantial situation reminds us that the place not only situates: **it positions us** (ŞAN, 2019).

However, it is with Heaven that there is the human capacity to establish an exchange of meanings beyond the simple meanings given to human historical and geographical landmarks. These are now positioned as endless variables of possible sociability in the face of economic and political orders, since the positioning of (and in) place interconnects several intersubjectivities in the mundane phenomenality, that is, it opens the communicability of the meaning shared by corporeality in several intentional narratives (PATOČKA, 2020 a).

This is what is understood by inhabiting the world: the human must consider that he depends on the mercy of Heaven and Earth, but it is essential that this has the effect of relativizing his “where I came from” (past), “where am I” (present) and “where am I going” (future). This means that this relativization - which fits into a maieutic exercise - is comprehensively historical, as a simple action on Earth can turn out to be a great (in) consequence somewhere in the world if this responsibility is not exercised⁴.

And considering the Heideggerian being-there (*Da-sein*) situated in the play between light and shadows, this historically positioning is also geographical, social, political, because it focuses on obtaining a heretical disposition regarding this treatise of Heidegger, or that of the place, making us ask: could it be that, in his writings, was Earth so inviting to Heaven? The snow in Georg Trakl's poem⁵ (TRAKL *apud* HEIDEGGER,

² Act called by Patočka of “care for the soul”.

³ Act called by Patočka of “living in truth”.

⁴ The “political mistakes” committed by several world leaders, when it comes to facing the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, is a great example.

⁵ A Winter Evening / Window with falling snow is arrayed, / Long tolls the vesper bell, / The house is provided well, / The table is for many laid. / Wandering ones, more than a few, / Come to the door on darksome courses. / Golden blooms the tree of graces / Drawing up the earth's cool dew. / Wanderer quiedy steps within; / Pain has turned the threshold to stone. / There lie, in limpid brightness shown, / Upon the table bread and wine.

2001b), quoted in full by him, would faithfully highlight the power of the meeting of possible trans-subjective meanings, in which this snow could lead us to reflect on how its icy touch could be incarnated (even in a tropical country like Brazil) in the solitude of those considered sub-human and forgotten in the middle of winter on the streets of the main Brazilian cities? Or does it only lead us to emphasize the solipsistic warmth of a Da-sein that homogenizes its surrounding world through simple daily habit? Furthermore, does the fog caused by this snow have a dazzling effect on the vision of its participants, to the point of creating a clearing in which other subjectivities are removed from the conformation of its celestial dome because they present other circumstances?

In short: can *Topos*, described by Heidegger (1992), really identify the messages sent by Heaven on the ups and downs of the Earth? This, because in this game of shadow and light - where one has its meaning revealed, however, not shaken, and the other that presents an absence of meaning, still, pregnant with the freedom and responsibility that Patočka alludes to -, what we have as a message in the multiple problems of our world are the salutary, environmental crises and the different types of violence (whether physical, moral, class or biological), making this message reach us in an abrupt and frightening way (BROWN; TOADVINE, 2003).

However, this is also an inviting way to exchange experiences and even solutions, since, invariably, we were relegated to an identification as beings conformed by the celestial dome, though, in an increasingly intricate positioning by the furrows of the Earth. This means that our **position** has become unstable to risks and urgent in relation to their resolution due to its incessant appeal to face the multiple human adversities, such as: the lack of treated water, food and even more terrifying experiences due to the ability to extinction of the human race on this planet, through predatory hunting, river pollution, forest fires, clandestine mining and countless military conflicts.

Although given our limitation for being a corporeal being, how can we position ourselves to at least take into account that the aforementioned situations are, at the very least, worrying? Situations that promise to be solved in the most diverse technological tricks apparently are insufficient to stop the catastrophe of the contemporary world.

Patočka (2004a), in a way, will insist on the possibility of dissidence caused by these situations in the resistances that subjects create from the moment their vulnerabilities appear in an emotional way. It means to say that any kind of resistance implies being created from an existential insecurity, but always as a collective activity. This existential insecurity faces the world in a complex image, in which the experience of freedom is to identify it as a problematic (vulnerable) field, that is, in which we always have to shake the impossible. More precisely, this shaking up the impossible is an act of refusing the conditions of the immediately given as if it were a traced destiny.

Perhaps here maieutics is extremely welcome, since it is the struggle against abrupt negation through the constant questioning of something conceivable as universal. Thus, human transcendence does not aim to reach a target greater than its existential capacity, but to deny a pre-given plot. It encourages heretical behavior in the face of possible canonizations of imposed facts or prescribed solutions. It presents a constant denial of the absolute frameworks of that self-absorbed self, whether in the financial field or in the aesthesis of a problem-free world (PATOČKA, 1996b). It points out that rootedness and self-sustainability connect us to the world as an inescapable totality already in our simple singularity (body) (RODRIGUEZ, 2014).

In fact, this maieutic (read from Patočka's perspective) is to keep in mind that the first existential movement is an act of engaging with the Earth through a concern with situated solidarity (PATOČKA, 2020b). And this in an attention to the instinctive demand for the development of human powers, and not a wait for its integral development, because it is in this instinct that human corporeity is born.

In the space-time relationship (Heaven and Earth) we have here the incarnate being committed to the other, as this is a constituent of the "I", making alterity the face of the world (that is, an act of humanization of the Earth), in which the various situations

that involve us are revealed (SERRANO, 2014). Here, the body engages in the spaces it encounters, not becoming a mere component in this space, but a vivid and sensitive movement to otherness. It becomes a perceptive agent, a co-constitutor of relationships to the other (CLADAKIS, 2019).

However, is the body flesh, and for that reason, qualifies the subject as existing? Not. Every existence that is synonymous with realization is active, as it is praxis, or rather, solidary. It is characterized by its level of interaction with the world, and it is only so because carnality (which we could also call sentience, language or affectivity) allows it. In other words, the subject is a **being-of-the-world** because, in the relationship between bodies and things, **the world changes according to the guidelines built in this movement of encounter.**

Thus, the body is not just a body, but corporeity in this movement that establishes it as an existent. It means to say that existential movements keep the space-time potential through a pact, in a discovery of the in-itself with for-itself. Corporeality is built as it approaches the world and recognizes its textures, in contact with its things: in malleability, rigidity, in warm or cold temperatures. This denotes that every situation, through the body, is already an involvement. And, more insistently, all involvement underlies a political element: its **positioning**, a movement that denotes an activity that manifests itself far beyond partial perception.

In this way, the transcendence desired by the human positioning in the world is due to the fact that its involvement in a field of possibilities based on its finitude to experience it. It is, indeed, important to emphasize that the body already gains third-person properties, as it emerges for the co-participation (movement-with) of situations that we can designate as common (as is the case of self-support that does not individual, as would like neoliberal theory). It is also having the impossibility of considering the body and the flesh in an objectified way, because with their positioning, they are judged through the places where decisions were made to be what they are in countless moments: in childhood, adolescence, at work, in the neighborhood(s) in which you lived in the city etc.

It is valid to say it is not the conscience that is responsible for this, but the carnality that provides to the "I" with this capacity for perception. In other words, a competence of perception, because it is covered up – and thanks to this situation – makes this "I" be marked out in the face of the potential opportunity to become self-absorbed. What does that mean? It means that the "I" is uncovered before the filter of the other. The "I" is perceived in the "you" and in the "we" (SERRANO, 2014). But this also depends on the way in which the "I" will appear to this other. This question, we would say aesthetics (*aesthesis*), is that of being involved in a process of an exposition that puts us in contact and circulation with other bodies, which appear to us involuntarily, that is, they are not destined to the sieve of our will.

Perhaps one of the most serious problems of the contemporary world there resides. This involuntary circulation of alterity is seen as a threat, since the individual autonomy of the contemporary subject faces social life in an *aesthesis* of itself, always interpreting the heterogeneous as a form of life that can cross its interests (SAFATLE, 2020). Here, even pathological problems arise, see the figure of fear, insecurity, hatred and segregation. And, clearly, the repression of sensitivity to third parties, this sensitivity being hidden in emotional basements, where individuals cling to but, at the same time, seek these same forms of affection in unusual places such as brothels, smokehouses or in actions consented (and made comical) such as exacerbated alcoholism.

4. Conclusion – A phenomenology of abandonment

However, as presented moments before, the proto-horizontality of the human world is collective participation, as it is political (PATOČKA, 1998). And the constitution of politics is always a question about how we will be affected by this heteronomy itself, in

fact, about what we will be able to feel with it or not. Every judgment of the “I” and the “we” starts from this principle.

Many could say that this heteronomous form coming from the human proto-horizontality, given by the affection, would be the cause of the irrationality of the present day politics. But would politics be a precise collection of arguments, which could fully account for the “badly articulated” passions arising from the despair of those trying to escape humiliation or violent death? Would there be time to build an emotional intelligence⁶ that could shape a human world that could be served by punctual resolution mechanisms?

This thoughtful emotional intelligence is the real lack of arguments, mainly, of the subjects that see themselves as owners of their person. And this comes from a society conceived in the “war of all against all”, composed of individuals with no relation to each other, having only as a synonym of collective a group of elements devoid of any interaction, since they are driven by desires wished anyway (SAFATLE, 2020). As everyone would have, in this “society”, the right to everything, there would quickly be an aggressive and competitive situation, and the only way to prevent a catastrophe is to promote a single type of feeling: cohesion, or rather, fear (TUAN, 2013).

An impulse that passes through marketing and propaganda tactics, relegating to the subject - in this case, the individual - the ability to protect while promoting a jurisdiction over himself, demonstrating examples of strength towards the weakest, as if social life were an addition of the predicates it has conquered. Furthermore, it is imagined that intersubjective issues are actually caught up in actions that, for the most part, have to confirm their attributes and identity as the owner of this image (SAFATLE, 2020). In this situation, the other is only useful to reinforce his arguments, or rather, his emotional intelligence, in which he believes in being able to transform him into a leader, martyr or spokesperson.

Thus, the other does not dispossess him at the moment of the encounter, he is only served as an aggregate of his “I”. And, at the same time, this relationship is given through fear, it is also a relationship of expectation. Since the full confirmation is the expectation of this certificate of the “I” that was built by himself, if we look closely, the subjects look for each other only to confirm each other, and not to reinvent themselves together with them. In this way, they seek an image that is simply their current image.

What does that mean? It means that the self-entrepreneur-subject creates a horizon so restricted by his own expectations that are restricted to the openings of other people's problems, given to the limitation of his experience. His existential time has, at this moment, a high dose of subjection, that is, subjection of the future by the present, in an articulating *imago mundi* to the point of incessantly subjecting him to having to deal with everything that will happen in the sphere of time, where he is obliged to confirm or deny these events, or rather, to defend himself against them (SAFATLE *et al*, 2021).

Here, that *imago mundi* - which is already disjointed in terms of individual strength -, will migrate to an extremely impersonal power, either through the algorithms of the countless cell phone applications in which the individual can manage his personal preferences without leaving home, or at more radical segregation such as living in condominiums (O'NEIL, 2016). In this way, linking fear and expectation to a time structure is one of the most practiced skills in the contemporary world, as this articulation prevents the dispossession of this subjectified life.

And it is at this point that Patočka's (2004a) natural world makes a counterpoint to this deterministic time, as it dispenses with a conflictive zone where life is not determined by a pre-founded instance, but by a community life where there is sharing the risks of living. It establishes exchanges that are rooted and worked on in the need for a shared language, whether in the combat against hunger or in the fight against the

⁶ A kind of human capacity to recognize and evaluate their own feelings and those of others, as well as the ability to deal with them, however, such intelligence converges in a highly economic reading through the combination of material success and social darwinism.

normalization of death. It is in him that corporeality pushes away a model of consciousness that claims to control the body, as it denounces what causes it in the many financial, biomedical, of nation projects etc. It fits into an answer on the question of movement as interaction as a concern with things on Earth, even those that escape from “self-jurisdiction”, since corporeity implies praxis (action in situation) in a relationship between distance and proximity.

And this relationship is interconnected by the body. That lands us in this movement of approaching and distancing in situations opened by the senses. This means that neither the world nor the subject is reduced here. They fight, lose and win each other continuously in the perpetual position in the world, in the different levels of socialization. Thus, that human freedom is an achievement in perceiving the different forms and possibilities of these levels.

Patočka's natural world thus approaches not only his objects, but himself (BARBARAS, 2019). Its so-called historical contingencies are not tied to an evolutionary line: they are denoted by a sentience of concrete and fully understandable manifestation (PATOČKA, 2020c). This means that the human world is not given as a collection of things. There is a more original consciousness, if we can say so: a consciousness of the world, a world oriented in perspective, in which the body moves to capture these perspectives and which also allows to be transformed in this synergistic movement.

This is the horizon of the world: causes and actions disappear in the singular perception, as the beginning of something takes place in a whole that is involuntarily present, that is, it includes even the unnoticed (ŞAN, 2019). Intentionality, in the perception of beings, is not restricted as something always wanted to be revealed in the same way: the perspective of movement - made by the body - changes it in even temporal scopes, as it circumscribes outside the linear notion of time, once that the understanding of the horizon of appearing delegitimizes the subject as the primary ability to institute a notion of evolution from its own sieve (RODRIGUEZ, 2014). In addition, measurement standards are rejected by determinations from *ergo sum*.

However, the *cogito* remains. But, it is believed that the ability to think and judge condition the “I” in a plurality, and this by recognizing itself as a non-all-embracing being, that is, one can have the memory of what was lived from somewhere, but it would not be this “I” who determines its aesthetic quality. His appearance is only called to own a small portion of this place. Thus, things have their aspect covered not only because they will be revealed through simple presence, but also because they are open to other perspectives beyond the singularity, making the “I” part of the world, and not the other way around.

In this way, the horizon of the world always goes beyond the limit of any authenticity. There will always be one more perspective on him, making the beings of this world not only qualified by their aspects, but in the calling that emanate to perceive them in multiple situations: when they grab us in their presence, when they leave us orphans of concrete and universal perspectives in their absence and when we are taught that the world is also characterized by what it is not - like the places of decrepitude and death.

Thus, this horizon puts us in solitude to the point of seeing ourselves incompletely, even when we are unable to share our experience with someone else (DODD, 2019). However, this is not in a form of seeking support, that is, this “seeing oneself” is seen as an incomplete act that launches us to simply fill some emptiness. It is a way to stop thinking about expectations of ready-made resolutions, to remove the authority of others for such an action, to imagine that what affects us can be fully controlled by us, in fact, that we would be the controlling agent of the arrival of these affections.

Abandoning this support is to know how to live under the whirlwind of these affections that form the world (SAFATLE, 2020). It is to have the conception that any action that constitutes this world is relational, or rather, that it does not take place through what is placed under the aegis of consciousness, but through a mobilization of an aesthesis that produces dynamics of circulation that involve subjects. More precisely, it is necessary to know how to get involved in these affects: a task of the proto-horizontality of this world.

This, when not properly understood, opens gaps to repression, envy and disqualification of the other for “lack of arguments” having, as the only desire for this world, its destruction by the hatred and disaffection of that individual who reacts (instinctively, and not consciously as he believes) precisely because of your own fear.

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